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Secure Sensitive Data Sharing on a Big Data Platform
Xinhua Dong, Ruixuan Li , Heng He, Wanwan Zhou, Zhengyuan Xue, and Hao Wu
Abstract: Users store vast amounts of sensitive data on a big data platform. Sharing sensitive data will help
enterprises reduce the cost of providing users with personalized services and provide value-added data services.
However, secure data sharing is problematic. This paper proposes a framework for secure sensitive data sharing
on a big data platform, including secure data delivery, storage, usage, and destruction on a semi-trusted big data
sharing platform. We present a proxy re-encryption algorithm based on heterogeneous ciphertext transformation
and a user process protection method based on a virtual machine monitor, which provides support for the realization
of system functions. The framework protects the security of users’ sensitive data effectively and shares these data
safely. At the same time, data owners retain complete control of their own data in a sound environment for modern
Internet information security.
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Introduction

With the rapid development of information digitization,
massive amounts of structured, semi-structured, and
unstructured data are generated quickly. By collecting,
sorting, analyzing, and mining these data, an enterprise
can obtain large amounts of individual users’ sensitive
data. These data not only meet the demands of
the enterprise itself, but also provide services to
other businesses if the data are stored on a big
data platform. Traditional cloud storage merely stores
plain text or encrypted data passively. Such data
can be considered as “dead”, because they are not
involved in calculation. However, a big data platform
allows the exchange of data (including sensitive
data). It provides mass data storage and computational
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services. Computation services refer primarily to
operations (such as encrypting data, conversion, or
function encryption) on data used by participants,
which can invigorate “dead” data. An example of such
an application is shown in Fig. 1 to illustrate the flow
process of sensitive data on such a platform.
In Fig. 1, we consider user’s preferences as sensitive
data. When Alice submits a query (sportswear), the
Search Engine Service Provider (SESP) first looks
for Alice’s preference on the big data platform. If
the big data platform has collected and shared the
user’s personal preference information, “badminton”,
then the search engine returns personalized results
(sportswear + badminton) to Alice. When Alice sees

Fig. 1

Application of sensitive data (user’s preferences).
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her favorite badminton sportswear, she experiences a
pleasant purchase. Consequently, this leads to a winwin situation. However, while data sharing increases
enterprise assets, Internet insecurity and the potential
of sensitive data leakage also create security issues for
sensitive data sharing.
Secure sensitive data sharing involves four primary
safety factors. First, there are security issues when
sensitive data are transmitted from a data owner’s local
server to a big data platform. Second, there can be
sensitive data computing and storage security problems
on the big data platform. Third, there are secure
sensitive data use issues on the cloud platform. Fourth,
there are issues involving secure data destruction. Some
research institutions and scholars at home and abroad
have made positive contributions to exploration and
research aimed at solving these security problems.
Existing technologies have partially resolved data
sharing and privacy protection issues from various
perspectives, but they have not considered the entire
process in the full data security life cycle. However,
a big data platform is a complete system with multistakeholder involvement, and thus cannot tolerate any
security breach resulting in sensitive data loss. In this
paper, we analyze security issues involving the entire
sensitive data sharing life cycle and describe a system
model created to ensure secure sensitive data sharing
on a big data platform, to guarantee secure storage on
the big data platform using Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE)
technology, and to ensure secure use of sensitive data
sharing using a private space process based on a Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM). Then, a security plug-in
and a data self-destruction mechanism help to alleviate
user concern regarding sensitive personal information
leakage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes related work. Section 3 proposes a
systematic framework for secure sensitive data
sharing. Section 4 explains secure submission and
storage of sensitive data based on PRE in detail. Section
5 provides our solution for ensuring secure sensitive
data use based on a VMM. Conclusions are drawn in
Section 6.

2

Related Work

In this section, we focus on previous work on relevant
topics such as encryption, access control, trusted
computing, and data security destruction technology in
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a cloud storage environment.
2.1

Data encryption and access control of cloud
storage

Regarding encryption technology, the Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) algorithm includes Key-Policy
ABE (KP-ABE)[1] and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CPABE)[2] . ABE decryption rules are contained in the
encryption algorithm, avoiding the costs of frequent
key distribution in ciphertext access control. However,
when the access control strategy changes dynamically,
a data owner is required to re-encrypt the data. A
method based on PRE is proposed in Ref. [3]. A
semi-trusted agent with a proxy key can re-encrypt
ciphertext; however, the agent cannot obtain the
corresponding plaintext or compute the decryption
key of either party in the authorization process[4] . A
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) mechanism is
proposed in Ref. [5]. The FHE mechanism permits
a specific algebraic operation based on ciphertext
that yields a still encrypted result. More specifically,
retrieval and comparison of the encrypted data produce
correct results, but the data are not decrypted
throughout the entire process. The FHE scheme requires
very substantial computation, and it is not always easy
to implement with existing technology. In regard to
ciphertext retrieval with a view toward data privacy
protection in the cloud, ciphertext retrieval solutions in
the cloud are proposed in Refs. [6–8]. Regarding access
control, a new cryptographic access control scheme,
Attribute-Based Access Control for Cloud Storage (ABACCS), is proposed in Ref. [9]. Each user’s private
key is labeled with a set of attributes, and data is
encrypted with an attribute condition restricting the user
to be able to decrypt the data only if their attributes
satisfy the data’s condition. Distributed systems with
Information Flow Control (DIFC)[10] use a tag to track
data based on a set of simple data tracking rules. DIFC
allow untrusted software to use private data, but use
trusted code to control whether the private data can
be revealed. In Ref. [11], the authors consider the
complexity of fine-grained access control for a large
number of users in the cloud and propose a secure
and efficient revocation scheme based on a modified
CP-ABE algorithm. This algorithm is used to establish
fine-grained access control in which users are revoked
according to Shamir’s theory of secret sharing. With a
Single Sign-On (SSO), any authorized user can log in
to the cloud storage system using a standard common
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application interface.
2.2

Trusted computing and process protection

Trusted Computing Group (TCG) introduced the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in its existing
architecture, to ensure that a general trusted computing
platform using TPM security features is credible. In
academia, the main research idea includes first
building a trusted terminal platform based on a
security chip, and then establishing trust between
platforms through remote attestation. Then, trust is
extended to the network. Integrity measurement is the
primary technical means of building a trusted terminal
platform. Research on virtual platform measurement
technology includes HIMA[12] and HyperSentry[13]
metric architecture. Using virtual platform isolation
features, HIMA measures the integrity of a virtual
machine by monitoring the virtual machine’s
memory. HyperSentry completes the integrity
measurement using a hardware mechanism. TCG
issued a Trusted Network Connection (TNC)
architecture specification version 1.0[14] in 2005,
characterized by having terminal integrity as a decision
of network access control. Chinese scholars have
conducted research on trusted network connections
based on the TNC architecture[15] . Beginning by
establishing the trust of the terminal platform, Feng
et al.[16] proposed a trustworthiness-based trust
model and provided a method of building a trust
chain dynamically with information flow. Zhang et
al.[17] proposed a transparent, backward-compatible
approach that protects the privacy and integrity
of customers’ virtual machines on commodity
virtualized infrastructures. Dissolver is a prototype
system based on a Xen VMM and a Confidentiality
and High-Assurance Equipped Operating System
(CHAOS)[18–21] . It ensures that the user’s text data exist
only in a private operating space and that the user’s key
exists only in the memory space of the VMM. Data
in the memory and the user’s key are destroyed at a
user-specified time.
2.3

Data destruction

Wang et al.[22] proposed a security destruction scheme
for electronic data. A new scheme, Self Vanish, is
proposed in Ref. [23]. This scheme prevents hopping
attacks by extending the lengths of key shares and
significantly increasing the cost of mounting an
attack. To solve the problem of how to prevent

sensitive information from leaking, when an emergency
occurs, Dong et al.[24] proposed a real-time sensitive
safe data destruction system. The open source cloud
computing storage system, Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS), cannot destroy data completely, which
may lead to data leak. To repair this flaw, Qin et al.[25]
designed a multi-grade safe data destruction mechanism
for HDFS. In Ref. [26], the authors proposed privacy
management across the entire data lifecycle and used
a mandatory data destruction protocol to control user
data.
As far as we know, few studies focus on the
sharing of sensitive data on a big data platform. In
Ref. [27], Razick et al. provided a common framework
for cataloguing and sharing both public and private data,
but they do not discuss data computation on a big data
platform. In this paper, we discuss the problem of data
storage, computing, use, and destruction.

3

Systematic Framework for Secure
Sensitive Data Sharing on a Big Data
Platform

Issuing and renting sensitive data on a semitrusted big data platform requires a data security
mechanism. Building secure channels for a full
sensitive data life cycle requires consideration of
four aspects of safety problems: reliable submission,
safe storage, riskless use, and secure destruction. A
systematic framework for secure sensitive data sharing
on a big data platform is shown in Fig. 2.
A common and popular method of ensuring data
submission security on a semi-trusted big data
platform is to encrypt data before submitting data to
the platform. Some operations (such as encryption,
decryption, and authorization) are provided using a
security plug-in. A cloud platform service provider
(such as an SESP) using data on a big data platform
ensures data security by downloading and using the
security plug-in.
To ensure secure storage,
we designed
Heterogeneous Proxy Re-Encryption (H-PRE), which
supports heterogeneous transformation from IdentityBased Encryption (IBE) to Public-Key Encryption
(PKE). H-PRE is compatible with traditional
cryptography. The intent is to transform the cipher
data that the owner uploads into ciphertext that the data
user can decrypt using his or her own private key.
We assume that the cloud cannot be trusted, and
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Fig. 2
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Systematic framework for secure sensitive data sharing on a big data platform.

that the decrypted clear text will leak users’ private
information. Therefore, we need to adopt process
protection technology based on a VMM, through a
trusted VMM layer, bypassing the guest operating
system and providing data protection directly to the
user process. The key management module of the
VMM is used for storing public keys of the new
register program group. When a program is running,
the symmetric key at the bottom of the main program
will be decrypted dynamically by the key management
module. All applications of the public and symmetric
keys are stored in the memory of the VMM.
The archive, replication, and backup mechanism of
cloud storage create data redundancy, requiring the
use of a suitable data destruction scheme to delete
the user’s private personal data. To achieve high
security, we designed a lease-based mechanism to
destroy private data and keys thoroughly in a controlled
manner. Cleartext and keys exist nowhere in the cloud,
after the lease expires.
The basic flow of the framework is as follows. First,
enterprises that have individual users’ sensitive
information pre-set those service providers that need
to share this sensitive information and then submit
and store the corresponding encrypted data on a
big data platform using the local security plugin. Second, we need to perform the required operation
with the submitted data using PRE on the big data
platform. Then, cloud platform service providers who
want to share the sensitive information download
and decrypt the corresponding data in the private

process space using the secure plug-in with sensitive
privacy data running in that space. Last, we use a
secure mechanism to destroy used data still stored
temporarily in the cloud. In short, the framework
protects the security of the full sensitive data life cycle
effectively. Meanwhile, data owners have complete
control over their own data. Next, we discuss the
most critical PRE algorithm based on heterogeneous
cipher-text transformation and user process protection
methods using the VMM.

4
4.1

Secure Submission and Storage
Sensitive Data Based on PRE

of

H-PRE

H-PRE involves three types of algorithm, traditional
identity-based encryption (including SetupIBE ,
KeyGenIBE , EncIBE , and DecIBE ), re-encryption
(including KeyGenRE , ReEnc, and ReDec functions),
and the last one is the traditional public key
cryptosystems (including KeyGenPKE , EncPKE , and
DecPKE ). The basic H-PRE process is simple. The data
owner encrypts sensitive data using a local security
plug-in and then uploads the encrypted data to a
big data platform. The data are transformed into the
ciphertext that can be decrypted by a specified user
after PRE services. If an SESP is the specified user,
then the SESP can decrypt the data using its own
private key to obtain the corresponding clear text. We
complete the following steps to implement the H-PRE
algorithm.
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(1) SetupIBE .k/: Input security parameters k,
generate randomly a primary security parameter mk,
calculate the system parameter set params using a
bilinear map and hash function.
(2) KeyGenIBE .mk, params, id/: When the user
requests the private key from the key generation center,
the key generation center obtains the legal identity (id)
of the user and generates the public and private keys
(pkid , skid ) for the user using params and mk.
(3) KeyGenPKE .params/: When a user submits a
request, the key management center not only generates
the identity-based public and private keys, but also
generates the public and private keys of the traditional
public key system (pk0id , sk0id ).
(4) EncIBE .pkid ; skid ; params; m/: When the user
encrypts data, the data owner encrypts the clear-text (m)
into the ciphertext (c D .c1 ; c2 /) using the user’s own
(pkid , skid ) and a random number (r 2 RZp ).
(5) KeyGenRE .skidi ; sk0idi ; pk0idj ; params/: When the
data owner (user i) grants user j permissions, using
skidi , sk0idi , and pk0idj , user i computes the PRE key
(rkidi idj ), completing the transformation from user i
to user j .
(6) ReEnc.ci ; rkidi idj ; params/: This process is
executed transparently on the big data platform. The
function re-encrypts the ciphertext that user i encrypted
into ciphertext that user j can decrypt. It inputs ci .ci D
.ci1 ; ci2 //, the PRE key (rkidi idj ), and related system
parameters, and then the big data platform computes
and outputs the PRE ciphertext (cj D .cj1 ; cj 2 /).
(7) DecPKE .cj ; sk0idj ; params/: This is a function for
decrypting the PRE ciphertext. After receiving the PRE
ciphertext (cj D .cj1 ; cj 2 /) from the proxy server of
the big data platform, user j determines the clear-text
(m0 D m) of the data using his or her own sk0idj .
4.2

The submission, storage, and extraction
operations of system sensitive data

The data owner encrypts data locally, first using
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric
encryption algorithm to encrypt the submission data and
then using the PRE algorithm to encrypt the symmetric
key of the data. These results are all stored within the
distributed data. In the meantime, if the data owner
shares the sensitive data with other users, the data owner
must authorize the sensitive data locally and generate
the PRE key, which is stored in the authorization key
server.
On the big data platform, the PRE server re-encrypts

and transforms the original cipher using the PRE
key. Then, PRE ciphertext, which can be encrypted by
the (authorized) data users, is generated. If the data user
wants to use the data on the big data platform, the data
user will send data requests to the platform and then
query whether there is corresponding data in the shared
space. If such data exist, the data user accesses and
downloads it. The operation on the big data platform
is independent and transparent to users. Moreover, the
computing resources of the big data platform are more
powerful than those of the client. Hence, we can put
PRE computational overhead on the big data platform
to improve user experience. The PRE system includes
data submission, storage (sharing), and data extraction
operations.
Data submission and storage (sharing) operations
After receiving the data uploading request, the Web
browser invokes the security plug-in and provides data
uploading services for the data owner, in accordance
with the following detailed steps. The browser (1)
reads the data files uploaded by the data owner,
generates randomly an AES transparent encryption key
(Symmetric Encryption Key, SEK), and then use the
AES algorithm to encrypt the data files; (2) uses the
PRE algorithm to encrypt the SEK and store the data
ciphertext and SEK ciphertext in the data centers; (3)
identifies from the data owner the users designated to
share the data; (4) uses the security plug-in to read
the private key of the data owner and obtain the data
user’s public key from the big data platform; (5) uses
the security plug-in to generate the corresponding PRE
key using the EncIBE function and to upload the PRE
key to the authorization key server of the big data
platform; and (6) re-encrypts the data using the ReEnc
function on the big data platform, thereby generating
PRE ciphertext.
Data extraction operations After receiving the
data download request, the Web browser invokes the
security plug-in and provides data download services
for the data user, in accordance with the following
detailed steps. The browser (1) queries whether there
is authorization for the data user on the PRE server
of the big data platform, and if an authorization is in
effect, proceeds to Step (2); (2) uses the download
plug-ins to send data download requests to the big
data platform, which then finds PRE ciphertext data
in the data center; (3) pushes the PRE ciphertext to
the secure data plug-in on the big data platform; (4)
invokes a data user’s download plug-in to read the user’s
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private key and prepares to decrypt data; (5) invokes a
data user’s download plug-in to decrypt received SEK
ciphertext using the DecPKE function and obtain the
AES symmetric key; and (6) permits the data user to
decrypt the data ciphertext using the AES symmetric
key to obtain the required clear text.
The data extraction operation is put into the private
space of a user process by the secure plug-in, a
prerequisite for secure use of sensitive data.

5
5.1

Secure Use of Sensitive Data on VMM
The private space of a user process based on a
VMM

To ensure secure running of an application in the
cloud, we use the private space of a user process
based on a VMM. We assume that some enterprise
(such as an SESP) rents Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) to complete some business. The business process
needs to extract sensitive personal data on the big data
platform. We call the protected program that extracts
sensitive data from the big data platform a sensitive
process. A threat model of a sensitive process on a
cloud platform is shown in Fig. 3. A sensitive process
must prevent threats from a management VMM and
an unreliable operating system layer below it. Rented
bottom hardware uses the TPM mode, ensuring that
the VMM is trusted. In this case, the key management
mechanism of the renter (such as an SESP) must build
this relationship based on trusting a VMM, ensuring
safe operation under the unreliable operating system.
The introduction of virtualization and trusted
computing technology ensures that service provider
applications and a secure plug-in run in the process
private space. This mode can protect the privacy of
sensitive data and avoid interference from external
programs, even the operating system. A safe operation

Fig. 3 Threat model of a sensitive process in a cloud
platform.
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process is shown in Fig. 4.
With PRE ciphertext calculated on a big data platform
extracted onto a cloud platform, private memory space
of processes on the cloud platform can guarantee
data security in memory and on the Hard Disk Drive
(HDD). First, the VMM provides private memory space
for specifying a VM process. The process runs in private
memory space whose memory cannot be accessed by
the operating system or other applications. The method
of memory isolation ensures data privacy and security
in the memory. Furthermore, the data used and stored
on disk is ciphertext. The VMM decrypts or encrypts
when reading or writing data, respectively. As a result,
a combination of these two measures can be protected
using the VMM, whether the user program runs in
memory or is stored on disk.
5.2

Secure use of system sensitive data

We use process protection technology based on a VMM,
through a trusted VMM layer, and bypass the guest
operating system, providing data protection directly to
the user process. To protect data security in the process
of interaction on the cloud platform, the following steps
must be completed.
(1) Establishing a credible environment and channels
During the booting process, the cloud platform
needs to measure startup software through trusted
computing technology. Therefore, cloud users (SESPs)
must ensure the integrity of the VMM, that is to
say, cloud users must ensure that the VMM is
trusted. After the booting process, the cloud server
will store Basic Input/Output System (BIOS), GRand
Unified Bootloader (GRUB), and VMM measurements
in the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) of the
TPM chip, and then send a remote verification to the
user to ensure the trust relationship between them.
The SESP must establish a reliable channel with
the VMM in the cloud, and then receive sensitive
data safely from the big data platform. The remote

Fig. 4

Safe operation process.
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attestation and hand shaking protocol between the SESP
and the VMM in the cloud is shown in Fig. 5.
In fact, the VMM responds to the request at the
cloud server end. First, the SESP sends an integrality
request to the cloud server, including the SESP public
key (PKid ) and timestamp (TS). Second, the VMM
generates a session key (Ksess ) and computes the
hashed value of TS, PKid , and Ksess using Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA1). Then, the VMM calls the
TPM quote instruction and passes the hashed value
and PCR as arguments to obtain the testimony (Quote)
using the TPM private key signature. The VMM uses
PKid to encrypt Ksess and then sends Ksess , Quote, and
a Certification Authority (CA) certificate to the other
side. The SESP verifies the value of TS, PKid , and
Ksess after receiving this information. If the values are
consistent, the communications are secure. As a result,
both sides of the communications determine a session
key. In the future, both sides of communication will be
encrypted using the session key.
(2) Data upload and extraction
The cloud users (SESP) extract the sensitive data
from the big data platform through retrieval. We assume
that the cloud is untrusted. The uploaded executable
application and data must be encrypted before the SESP
uses the cloud. The upload and extract protocol of the
data is shown in Fig. 6.
In Fig. 6, the SESP generates the AES symmetric
key and a pair of asymmetric keys (PKapp , SKapp ) using
the tools, encrypts the executable files and data files
using the AES symmetric key, and encrypts the AES
key by the asymmetric keys, which are attached at the
end of the application files. The data obtained from
the big data platform are PRE ciphertext, which can
be decrypted during runtime. The command format of
the new program must be identified when registering
the program. The user encrypts the PKid , registration
command, application name, public key (PKapp ), and

Fig. 5 Remote attestation and hand shaking protocol
between the SESP and the VMM in the cloud.
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Fig. 6

Upload and extract protocol of the data.

predetermined lease using Ksess , and then sends them to
the VMM. Finally, encrypted executable files and data
files are uploaded to the cloud server.
(3) Program execution
In the process of application execution on the cloud
platform, dynamic data protection and encryption are
similar to the protection of process memory space[18–21] ,
as shown in Fig. 4. During process execution, the
occupied memory process cannot be accessed by other
processes and operating systems. The VMM serves
as the bridge of data exchange between the operating
system and the user process. When the OS copies
the data from the user memory space, the VMM, not
the operating system, performs the copying operation,
because the operating system lacks read and write
privileges. When the data are copied into the private
memory space of the process, the VMM decrypts the
data using the corresponding AES symmetric key. Thus,
the data can be computed normally. Conversely, when
the data in the private memory space of the process are
copied to the outside, the VMM encrypts the data using
the corresponding AES symmetric key. Hence, the user
data stored on disk is in ciphertext form.
In a word, in the private space of a user process,
the security plug-in decrypts PRE data from the big
data platform, and the VMM decrypts data from the
cloud user (SESP). The generated data are encrypted
when the user process is completed, and then the data is
destroyed according to the terms of the lease. Therefore,
the private space of the user process acts as a balance
point of the security mechanism between the data owner
and user, benefiting both while preventing sensitive
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information leakage.

6

[6]

Conclusions

In summary, we proposed a systematic framework
of secure sharing of sensitive data on big data
platform, which ensures secure submission and storage
of sensitive data based on the heterogeneous proxy
re-encryption algorithm, and guarantees secure use of
clear text in the cloud platform by the private space
of user process based on the VMM. The proposed
framework well protects the security of users’ sensitive
data. At the same time the data owners have the
complete control of their own data, which is a feasible
solution to balance the benefits of involved parties
under the semi-trusted conditions. In the future, we
will optimize the heterogeneous proxy re-encryption
algorithm, and further improve the efficiency of
encryption. In addition, reducing the overhead of the
interaction among involved parties is also an important
future work.
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